An armed police officer stands on a road leading towards a large yellow building

“断代断根”

中国对维吾尔人及其他突裔厥穆斯林的危害人类罪行

A Chinese police officer guards the road near a “reeducation” camp in Yining, Xinjiang, September 4, 2018.  © 2018 Thomas Peter/Reuters

摘要

“断代、断根、断联、断源一个不漏,彻底把‘两面人’的根子铲干净、挖干净,誓与‘两面人’斗争到底。”

——买苏木江・买木尔(Maisumujiang Maimuer),宗教事务官员,2017年8月10日,新华社微博

2014年5月,中国政府在新疆维吾尔自治区针对突厥裔穆斯林发动“严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动”。1] 史丹福大学法律学院人权与冲突解决诊所和人权观察的研究,以及各人权组织、媒体、维权团体等各方面的报导,显示中国政府对当地突厥裔穆斯林人口已经实施——且仍在持续实施——危害人类罪行。[2]

本报告为前述结论提出事实基础,并基于国际法框架对中国政府在新疆作为的可得资讯进行评估。

根据《国际刑事法院罗马规约》,危害人类罪是指在明知对任何平民人口进行广泛或有系统攻击下,作为攻击的一部分而实施的重大特定罪行。“普遍”意指行为的规模或受害者的人数。“有系统”攻击是指形成模式或按部就班的计划。危害人类罪可以在和平时期或者武装冲突期间实施,只要它是针对平民人口。

危害人类罪被视为国际法上最严重的人权侵犯之一。本报告纪录的具体危害人类罪行包括:违反国际法的监禁或以其他形式剥夺自由;迫害一个可识别的族群或宗教群体;强迫失踪;酷刑;谋杀;以及疑似故意造成极大痛苦或对身心健康造成严重伤害的不人道行为,特别是强迫劳动和性暴力。

新疆维吾尔自治区位于中国西北部,是中国唯一以穆斯林人口占多数的地区。该地区包括维吾尔族、哈萨克族、柯尔克孜族及其他多个民族均属突厥裔族群。和中国多数民族即主要说中文的汉族不同,突厥裔人口多为穆斯林并有自己的母语。根据2010年人口普查,维吾尔族约占新疆人口的百分之46,哈萨克族约占百分之7。

中国政府对突厥裔穆斯林的镇压并不是新的现象,但在最近几年达到前所未见的程度。高达一百万人被任意拘禁在300到400间设施,[3] 包括“政治教育”营、看守所和监狱。[4] 法院未经正当程序即判下重刑,突厥裔穆斯林仅因向家属寄送伊斯兰宗教影音或下载维吾尔文电子书就被判处数年监禁。在押人员和囚犯受到酷刑和其他虐待、文化和政治思想灌输以及强迫劳动。这些镇压直到离开拘禁设施仍在持续:中国当局对突厥裔穆斯林施加广泛的大规模监控系统、限制迁徙、任意逮捕和强迫失踪、抹杀其文化与宗教、以及拆散家庭。

美国国务院和比利时、加拿大及荷兰国会皆已认定中国的行为亦构成国际法上的种族灭绝。人权观察目前尚未纪录到种族灭绝蓄意要件的存在。不过,本报告内容并不排除这种结论,而且,若有相关证据出现,目前针对新疆突厥裔穆斯林——作为受到1948年种族灭绝罪公约保护的一个群体——所实施的各种行为也可能支持种族灭绝的结论。

2017年,根据官方统计,新疆逮捕人数几乎占到全中国逮捕人数近百分之21,尽管新疆居民仅占全国人口的百分之1.5。从2017年起,中国当局利用各种不同理由损坏或摧毁了新疆三分之二的清真寺;其中近半遭彻底推平。全区主要的伊斯兰教圣地都被铲除。[5] 自治区当局以“结亲”名义实施侵入性的监控、发展与思想灌输计划,派遣官员干部到突厥裔穆斯林的家中留宿,美其名为“促进民族团结”。另一种骇人措施是,有些突厥裔穆斯林儿童因父母遭任意拘禁而被安置到孤儿院或寄宿学校、寄宿幼儿园等官方设施。[6]

这种种侵犯人权的举措已日益招致全球质疑。有些政府,如加拿大、欧盟、英国和美国,已经对中国政府官员与涉及侵犯人权的企业实施针对性或其他类型的制裁。越来越多国家加入在联合国人权理事会和联合国大会第三委员会(负责人权事务)发表的声明,谴责中国政府相关政策。然而,仍有许多国家对中国政府的新疆政策表示赞扬,包括伊斯兰合作组织的部分成员。

2019年7月,24个国家联名致函人权理事会主席,要求让联合国人权事务高级专员对新疆人权进行“有效视察”,监测并报告当地疑似侵犯穆斯林人口的行为。[7] 中国政府的反应是组织其他50个国家(不包括中国本身)发表联名信,签署者包括伊朗、北韩、沙特阿拉伯、委内瑞拉等人权纪录恶劣的国家。[8] 2019年11月,同一群国家又向联大第三委员会递交一份谴责声明。中国政府再次以54国联名信回应。[9]

2020全年,有关新疆人权侵犯的报导持续增加,使各国政府更难否认或忽视。 2020年6月,50个联合国特别程序——包括特别报告员、工作组和其他人权专家——对中国人权纪录发出强烈指控,包括中国政府对新疆、西藏的宗教和少数民族进行“集体镇压” 。专家们呼吁人权理事会就中国问题召开特别会议,成立专责监测中国的联合国机制,并要求联合国机构与各国政府施压中国履行人权义务。[10] 2020年10月,跨区域集团的39个国家发表公开声明,尖锐抨击中国政府在新疆、香港和西藏的普遍人权侵害。该声明大体上支持前述联合国50个特别程序的呼吁。[11]中国政府没有对相关指控进行调查,仅以两份声明回应,其中一份关于新疆的声明由古巴宣读,并有45国联署。[12]

调查中国危害人类罪

在发生严重人权侵害区域享有管辖权的国家,有义务确保相关罪行受到司法追究。该等国家有义务确保国内刑事司法机制就疑似人权侵害实施公正调查,并依据国际公正审判标准查明并起诉责任人。中国政府一再否认有官员在新疆涉及侵犯人权,既不愿自行调查也不允许独立的国际监察员实地调查。

历史上,未对严重人权侵犯进行调查的政府往往援引国家主权,拒绝其他有关当局如联合国机构或区域性国际组织前往调查。根据2002年生效的《国际刑事法院罗马规约》,若享有主要管辖权的国家缺乏意愿或能力,该法院即有权对疑涉危害人类罪及其他重大国际罪行的主要责任人进行调查和起诉。若涉嫌加害人是国际刑事法院缔约国的公民,若相关罪行发生在国际刑事法院成员国的领土,或若有非成员国请求国际刑事法院审查在其领土内发生的罪行,国际刑事法院便可实施调查与起诉。中国并非国际刑事法院成员国。虽然国际刑事法院可以在联合国安全理事会将新疆情势移交该法院时取得管辖权,但中国作为安理会常任理事国可以动用否决权阻止移交。

鉴于突厥裔穆斯林所受的迫害如此严重,有关各国迫切需要采取强硬、一致的问责行动。办法之一是由联合国成立调查委员会,对新疆人权侵犯的指控进行调查。调查委员会职权应包括认定事实、查明加害人和提出问责建议。委员会应由知名人士组成,包括国际人权法、危害人类罪、少数族群与宗敎权利以及性别议题等专家。委员会可以通过联合国人权理事会的决议成立,但联合国大会、联合国安理会和联合国秘书长也都有权采取相关行动。

本报告也对各有关国家提出其他建议,以便加强施压中国政府,改变其侵犯人权的新疆政策,包括追究相关罪行的个人刑责与国家责任、针对性制裁、以及根据其他联合国机制如《消除一切形式种族歧视国际公约》采取行动。

个别国家应当考虑刑事追诉——根据“普遍管辖权”(universal jurisdiction)概念,各国可以利用国内司法系统调查和起诉诸如酷刑等特定重大犯罪,即使犯罪地点不属该国领土。许多国家都已立法允许对被害人为本国国民的这类罪行加以起诉。各种人权条约,例如《反酷刑公约》和《反强迫失踪国际公约》,都要求缔约国引渡或起诉在其境内的嫌疑犯。根据国际习惯法,各国基本上可以对危害人类罪的嫌犯进行起诉。

建议

对中国政府

  • 立即采取措施,终止对新疆和其他地区突厥裔穆斯林的人权侵害,特别是:任意拘押和监禁,包括所谓的再教育营;酷刑和其他虐待;限制宗教自由、隐私与迁徙;性暴力和强迫绝育;以及强迫劳动。

  • 立即采取措施,终止对突厥裔穆斯林的疑涉危害人类罪行。

  • 调查并适当起诉涉嫌严重侵犯人权和危害人类罪的政府官员。

对联合国

  • 联合国人权理事会应通过决议成立调查委员会,并授予下列权限:

    • 调查以新疆突厥裔穆斯林为目标的疑涉危害人类罪和其他人权侵害行为,包括:非法监禁或其他形式严重剥夺人身自由;基于政治、种族、民族、族群、文化或宗教理由迫害某个可识别团体;强迫失踪;酷刑;谋杀;其他不人道行为,包括强迫劳动;限制宗教自由;性暴力;以及侵犯生育权利;

    • 作出终止相关侵犯行为的建议;

    • 指出负责官员并提出将其绳之以法的具体途径;

    • 呼吁给予受害者和幸存者适当赔偿;以及

    • 定期向理事会和联合国其他相关机构提交报告。

  • 联合国人权事务高级专员应履行其独立监察和报告的职权,收集相关资讯,就其结论发表公开抗议,为新疆人权情势撰写报告,并定期向人权理事会提供更新资讯。

  • 联合国各种特别程序应就其职权对中国当局在新疆侵犯人权进行持续纪录和公开报导,据以支持设立调查委员会或类似的调查机制。

  • 联合国秘书长应公开支持对新疆人权侵犯成立调查委员会,并在公开和私下敦促中国当局终止对新疆突厥裔穆斯林的迫害。秘书长应公开支持对发生在新疆的危害人类罪行追究责任。

  • 联合国大会应要求负责调查新疆人权侵犯的委员会也向大会提交报告,并将相关报告转交给所有联合国成员国和联合国有关机构。

  • 大会应通过决议,公开支持具体问责措施,包括对危害人类罪的责任人实施针对性制裁。

  • 联合国安全理事会成员国应在中国作为常任理事国的条件下采取最大可能的行动,包括通过阿里亚办法(Arria Formula)会议或其他途径,对于成立委员会调查新疆人权侵害表达支持。

对有关各国政府

协调一致的双边或多边行动

  • 依据美国《全球马格尼茨基法》和类似的政府间或国内法律工具,实施签证禁令、旅游禁令和针对性个别制裁;这种制裁若以集体方式实施将更有成效。

  • 在所有谴责新疆人权侵犯的个别或联合声明中,指出中国当局应为犯罪行为负责,这些行为是针对新疆突厥裔穆斯林的普遍且有系统攻击的一部分,构成危害人类罪。

  • 基于普遍管辖权的法律基础,协助起诉涉及危害人类罪的中国官员。

  • 鼓励本国检察官发动框架性调查,即类似国际刑事法院的初步审查,由检察机关针对疑涉严重违法行为收集并分析有关资讯,为将来起诉奠定基础。

  • 对既经证实协助中国在新疆执行大规模监控的科技业者实施更强硬行动,包括引用《全球马格尼茨基法》和类似的制裁措施。

  • 《消除一切形式种族歧视国际公约》缔约各国应就中国对突厥裔穆斯林的违反公约行为提出个别或联合控诉。

关于贸易、投资和商业活动

  • 有关政府机构应审查所有对新疆的投资,并在必要时针对据可靠指控涉及严重侵害(例如强迫劳动)的产业部门实施贸易制裁,包括撤资。

  • 向企业发出类似加拿大于20211月针对下列议题所做的公开建议:

    • 新疆人权侵害的严重性,包括强迫劳动;

    • 企业依据国际法和国内法应负的法律责任;

    • 因直接商业活动和供应链成为人权侵害共犯的风险;以及

    • 对于在中国一切商业交易应进行透明及彻底人权尽职调查的责任。

    • 在有关强迫劳动的举报得到独立且公正的国际专家调查、侵害得到解决、加害者受到追究且受害者得到赔偿之前,欧盟不应将《欧中投资协定》送交欧洲议会通过。

  • 呼吁工商业者公开发布在新疆开展业务对象的名称、地址、所有权及其他相关详情。

  • 立法规定在新疆运营企业必须执行人权尽职调查。

  • 检讨国际金融机构的投资组合,确保其不致参与该地区的迫害行为。

对境内有突厥裔流亡社群的各国

  • 确保突厥裔穆斯林申请庇护能够得到公正制度的裁决。

  • 允许突厥裔穆斯林的家属入境团聚,以协助家庭团聚。

  • 终止一切遣返措施及其他形式直接或间接强迫突厥裔穆斯林返回中国。

  • 建立机制以追踪发生在其他国家的骚扰突厥裔穆斯林案件,并采取包括刑事司法在内的措施以追究加害者责任。

  • 确保突厥裔穆斯林能够获得为酷刑、强暴和其他犯罪被害人提供的法律、医疗和心理援助,以及文化与宗教保存方案。

对企业和投资者

  • 认识到目前在新疆因为政府干预已不可能履行联合国《工商企业与人权指导原则》要求承担的人权尽职调查责任。

  • 加入为终止涉及突厥裔穆斯林强迫劳动做法的行动呼吁,或采取类似措施。

 

 

[1] The region is home to several different communities of Turkic Muslims; the two biggest groups are 11 million Uyghurs and 1.6 million Kazakhs. There are also smaller communities of Kyrgyz and others. Human Rights Watch has documented abuses against members of each of these communities, including arbitrary detention in “political education” camps. For this report, we use the term Turkic Muslims to refer to all members of the community targeted by Chinese government policies.

[2] See Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed: China’s Operating Manuals For Mass Internment And Arrest By Algorithm,” International Consortium of Journalists, November 24, 2019, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/; Steven Lee Myers, “China Defends Crackdown on Muslims, and Criticizes Times Article,” New York Times, November 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslims-leak.html; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “The Mass Internment of Uyghurs: ‘We want to be respected as humans. Is it too much to ask?’” https://uhrp.org/press-release/mass-internment-uyghurs-%E2%80%9Cwe-want-be-respected-humans-it-too-much-ask%E2%80%9D.html.

[3] Alison Killing, Megha Rajagopalan, and Christo Buschek, “Blanked-Out Spots On China’s Maps Helped Us Uncover Xinjiang’s Camps,” Buzzfeed News, August 27, 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alison_killing/satellite-images-investigation-xinjiang-detention-camps; Kelsey Munro, “Xinjiang Data Project website launch,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 25, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/news/xinjiang-data-project-website-launch.

[4] Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, and Nathan Ruser, “Xinjiang’s Re-education Camps,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 1, 2018, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-xinjiangs-re-education-camps.

[5] Nathan Ruser, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Tilla Hoja, “Cultural Erasure,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 23, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure.

[6] Adrian Zenz, “Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 7, July 2019.

[7] Joint letter to the Human Rights Council president on Xinjiang, July 2019, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190708_joint_statement_xinjiang.pdf.

[8] Nick Cumming-Bruce, “China’s Retort Over Its Mass Detentions: Praise From Russia and Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, July 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/world/asia/china-human-rights-united-nations.html.

[9] “54 countries voice support for China's counter-terrorism measures in Xinjiang,” Xinhua, October 30, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/30/c_138514935.htm.

[10] “UN experts call for decisive measures to protect fundamental freedoms in China,” June 26, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006.

[11] Statement by Ambassador Christoph Heusgen on behalf of 39 Countries in the Third Committee General Debate, October 6, 2020, https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/201006-heusgen-china/2402648.

[12] Cuba Made a Joint Statement on Behalf of 45 Countries in Firm Support of China’s Counter-Terrorism and Deradicalization Measures in Xinjiang, October 6, 2020, http://chnun.chinamission.org.cn/eng/hyyfy/t1822121.htm.

[13] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/china0405.pdf.

[14] Ibid., p. 13.

[15] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang,” July 9, 2008, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/09/behind-violence-xinjiang.

[16] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang.”

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows, p. 10.

[20] Known as Yining in Chinese.

[21] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows; Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang”; Amnesty International, “People’s Republic of China: Rebiya Kadeer’s personal account of Gulja after the massacre on 5 February 1997,” 2007, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/64000/asa170012007en.pdf; Amnesty International, “Remember the Gulja massacre? China’s crackdown on peaceful protesters,” 2007.

[22] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows.

[23] Ibid., p. 3-4; for a comprehensive overview and analysis of sources of ethnic tensions in the region in recent history, see 伊力哈木 (Ilham Tohti), 当前新疆民族问题的现状及建议 (Present-Day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang: Overview and Recommendations), https://chinachangedotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/e4bc8ae58a9be59388e69ca8efbc9ae5bd93e5898de696b0e79686e6b091e6978fe997aee9a298e79a84e78eb0e78ab6e58f8ae5bbbae8aeae1.pdf; translated at http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/pdf/ilham-tohti_present-day-ethnic-problems-in-xinjiang-uighur-autonomous-region-overview-and-recommendations_complete-translation1.pdf.

[24] Chris Buckley, “China calls Xinjiang riot a plot against rule,” Reuters, July 5, 2009.

[25] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled: An Assessment of China’s National Human Rights Action Plan, January 2011, https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/01/11/promises-unfulfilled/assessment-chinas-national-human-rights-action-plan, p. 49.

[26] Ibid., p. 33-36; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Demand Release of Seriously Ill Uighur,” March 10, 2011, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/28000/asa170112011en.pdf.

[27] Amnesty International, “Justice, Justice”: The July 2009 protests in Xinjiang, China, 2010, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/36000/asa170272010en.pdf; Amnesty International, “China urged to release Uighur activist allegedly tortured in prison,” December 20, 2010, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2010/12/china-debe-liberar-activista-uigur-presuntamente-torturado-carcel/.

[28] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled; Human Rights Watch, “We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them”: Enforced Disappearances in the Wake of Xinjiang’s Protests, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/xinjiang1009webwcover.pdf, p. 21-32; Amnesty International, “Justice, Justice”; Amnesty International, “China must reveal whereabouts of Uighur children detained after deadly clash,” January 6, 2012, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/01/china-must-reveal-whereabouts-uighur-children-detained-after-deadly-clash.

[29] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang”; Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled, p. 49; Dan Levin, “China Remodels and Ancient Silk Road City, and an Ethnic Rift Widens,” New York Times, March 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/asia/china-remodels-an-ancient-silk-road-city-and-an-ethnic-rift-widens.html.

[30] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled, p. 62-63; Human Rights Watch, “Letter from HRW to Grand Imam Ahmed el Tayeb Re: Forced Return of Ethnic Uyghurs to China,” July 7, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/letter-hrw-grand-imam-ahmed-el-tayeb; Human Rights Watch, “Malaysia/China: Prevent Forced Return of Uighurs,” August 22, 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/22/malaysia/china-prevent-forced-return-uighurs; Sara Colm, “Analysis: Inside Perspective on Uighurs,” Phnom Penh Post, December 20, 2010, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/analysis-inside-perspective-uighurs; Human Rights Watch, “China: Forcibly Returned Uighur Asylum Seekers at Risk,” December 22, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/12/22/china-forcibly-returned-uighur-asylum-seekers-risk; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Demand Release of Seriously Ill Uighur,” March 10, 2011; World Uyghur Congress and Uyghur Human Rights Project, Alternative Report: Submission to the United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT) In Consideration of CAT/C/CHN/5 2(2015), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/CHN/INT_CAT_CSS_CHN_22111_E.pdf.

[31] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang.”

[32] “Xinjiang’s Party chief wages ‘people’s war’ against terrorism,” China Daily, May 26, 2014, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/26/content_17541318.htm.

[33] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses”: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims, September 2018, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web2.pdf, p. 11-25; Joanne Smith Finley, “Securitzation, insecurity and conflict in contemporary Xinjiang: has PRC counter-terrorism evolved into state terror?” Central Asian Survey, 2019, p. 1-3; James Millward, “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims,”ChinaFile, February 7, 2019, https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/reeducating-xinjiangs-muslims.

[34] Smith Finley, “Securitization, insecurity and conflict in contemporary Xinjiang,” Central Asian Survey, p. 1, 3, 23, n.6.

[35] Ibid. Note that this economic development has nevertheless largely benefitted Han Chinese settlers.

[36] Chris Buckley, “The Leaders Who Unleashed China’s Mass Detention of Muslims,” New York Times, October 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/13/world/asia/china-muslim-detainment-xinjang-camps.html; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” China Brief, September 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/; Edward Wong, “China Said to Detain Returning Tibetan Pilgrims,” New York Times, April 7, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/world/asia/china-said-to-detain-returning-tibetan-pilgrims.html.

[37] International Campaign for Tibet, “The origin of the ‘Xinjiang model’ in Tibet under Chen Quanguo: Securitizing ethnicity and accelerating assimilation,” December 19, 2018, https://savetibet.org/the-origin-of-the-xinjiang-model-in-tibet-under-chen-quanguo-securitizing-ethnicity-and-accelerating-assimilation/; Sui-Wee Lee, “China's top Tibet official orders tighter control of Internet,” Reuters, February 29, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet/chinas-top-tibet-official-orders-tighter-control-of-internet-idUSTRE8200BZ20120301; Human Rights Watch, “China: China Poised to Repeat Tibet Mistakes Abusive Policies Planned for Uyghur Region,” January 20, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/20/china-poised-repeat-tibet-mistakes.

[38] Deng Yuwen, “Reading the China Dream,” https://www.readingthechinadream.com/deng-yuwen-chinese-statism.html.

[39] “Full Transcript: Interview with Xinjiang Government Chief on Counterterrorism, Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang,” People’s Daily, October 16, 2018, http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/1016/c90000-9508925.html.

[40] Human Rights Watch, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A Topical Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 2006, https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/07/26/genocide-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity/topical-digest-case-law.

[41] Ibid.

[42] The UN International Law Commission has prepared draft articles on prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity, which adopt the ICC Statute’s definition of the offense. The Draft Articles are under consideration in the UN General Assembly.

[43] Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” September 10, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/10/china-free-xinjiang-political-education-detainees; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018; Emily Feng, “Uighur children fall victim to China anti-terror drive,” Financial Times, July 9, 2018.

[44] Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” China Brief, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang; Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Equal Rights Initiative, “China: Massive Numbers of Uyghurs and Other Ethnic Minorities Forced into Re-education Programs,” August 3, 2018, https://www.nchrd.org/2018/08/china-massive-numbers-of-uyghurs-other-ethnic-minorities-forced-into-re-education-programs. This estimate was cited by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in its concluding observations to its review of China. CERD, Concluding observations on the combined fourteenth to seventeenth periodic reports of China (including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China), CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17, 2018, para. 40. Note that Zenz has recently revised his estimate to between 900,000 and 1.8 million. Adrian Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 11, November 2019.

[45] Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “The China Challenge, Part 3: Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law,” December 4, 2018, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418_Busby_Testimony.pdf; “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第14期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 14), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558505/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-Chinese.pdf, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558506/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-English.pdf.

[46] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Testimony of Rushan Abbas, Director of Campaign for Uyghurs, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “ARIA in Action, Part 1: Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law,” April 9, 2019, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/040919_Abbas_Testimony.pdf; Sada Seytoff and Alim Seytoff, “Academic Freedom Watchdog Demands China Unconditionally Release Prominent Uyghur Scholar,” Radio Free Asia, November 2, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-11022018134451.html.

[49] 吐鲁番市集中教育培训学校学员子女问答策略 (Tactics from Turpan City for answering questions asked by the children of concentrated education and training school students), translated in “Document: What Chinese Officials Told Children Whose Families Were Put in Camps,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-detention-directive.html (Tactics from Turpan City).

[50] Ben Dooley, “Inside China’s internment camps: tear gas, Tasers and textbooks,” Agence France-Presse, October 25, 2018, https://www.afp.com/en/inside-chinas-internment-camps-tear-gas-tasers-and-textbooks.

[51] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558509/China-Cables-Telegram-Chinese.pdf, para. 14, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510/China-Cables-Telegram-English.pdf; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/.

[52] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “‘Ideological Transformation’: Records of Mass Detention from Qaraqash, Hotan,” February 2020, https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_QaraqashDocument.pdf.

[53] These countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Alexandra Ma, “China is using flimsy excuses to lock up its Muslim minority on a huge scale — here are some of the bizarre reasons people are in jail,” Business Insider, September 16, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-gives-these-excuses-to-imprison-uighur-ethnic-minority-2018-9.

[54] Detention for this reason is especially unjust in that the government, during a brief period in 2015, encouraged Uyghurs to apply for passports, and that many of the Uyghurs detained on this basis appear to have applied for passports during this window. Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 10.

[55] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 10.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., p. 11, 16.

[58] Ibid., p. 13.

[59] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 3, 24-25.

[60] Amnesty International, “Separated Souls: Uighur journalist’s unbreakable resolve to help her detained family,” March 16, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/uighur-journalists-unbreakable-resolve-to-help-detained-family/; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Detained Uighur Has Nervous Breakdown.”

[61] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 4. This information appears to power what officials termed the “three circles and six diagrams collision analysis” (三圈六图碰撞分析), a method by which authorities analyze and evaluate detainees.

[62] Gerry Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News, May 17, 2018, https://apnews.com/6e151296fb194f85ba69a8babd972e4b/China%E2%80%99s-massindoctrinationcamps-evoke-Cultural-Revolution.

[63] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 14.

[64] Ibid., para. 16.

[65] Ibid., para. 17; Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “New Leak Reveals Orders for China’s Internment Camps,” New York Times, November 24, 2019; Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News.

[66] Tactics from Turpan City.

[67] Terence McCoy, “China scores 99.9 percent conviction rate last year,” Washington Post, March 11, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/03/11/china-scored-99-9-percent-conviction-rate-last-year/; Lily Kuo, “China’s criminal conviction rate is 99.9 percent,” Quartz, August 7, 2014, https://qz.com/246696/chinas-criminal-conviction-rate-is-99-9/; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017,” July 2018; Emily Feng, “‘Illegal Superstition’: China Jails Muslims For Practicing Islam, Relatives Say,” National Public Radio, October 8, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/10/08/764153179/china-has-begun-moving-xinjiang-muslim-detainees-to-formal-prisons-relatives-say; Chris Buckley, “China’s Prisons Swell After Deluge of Arrests Engulfs Muslims,” New York Times, August 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/world/asia/xinjiang-china-uighurs-prisons.html.

[68] Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”

[69] Gene A. Bunin, “The Elephant in the XUAR,” December 9, 2020, https://livingotherwise.com/2020/12/09/the-elephant-in-the-xuar-i-entire-families-sentenced/.

[70] Adrian Zenz, “China’s Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,” China Brief, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-domestic-security-spending-analysis-available-data/; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” China Brief, September 2017.

[71] Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Detained Uighur Has Nervous Breakdown,” March 20, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1700732019ENGLISH.pdf; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: 30 Relatives of Uighur Activist Arbitrarily Detained,” November 14, 2017, https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/uaa25117-3.pdf; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: 20 Relatives of Uighur Journalist Detained,” March 1, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1779642018ENGLISH.pdf.

[72] Human Rights Watch, Submission to Universal Periodical Review of China, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/29/submission-universal-periodic-review-china; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”

[73] Ibid.

[74] Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” September 10, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/10/china-free-xinjiang-political-education-detainees.

[75] Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”

[76] Entry 13409: Jin Dehuai, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=13409.

[77] Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Chaqiliq County People’s Court Criminal Verdict, 2018, Xinjiang 2824 Criminal-Case No. 121, https://shahit.biz/verview.php?no=35.

[78] Entry 915: Asqar Azatbek, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=915.

[79] Entry 5821: Nurlan Pioner, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=5821.

[80] Entry 11997: Nie Shigang, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=11997.

[81] Verdict against Serikzhan Adilhan, convicted of running an illegal business ( 塞力克江·阿德勒汗非法经营罪二审刑事裁定书 ), September 5, 2019, China Judgement Online, https://archive.vn/5mxOi.

[82] Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region High People’s Court Criminal Judgment, 2017, Xinjiang 40 Criminal Final No. 78, https://shahit.biz/verview.php?no=36.

[83] “Siblings Get Lengthy Jail Terms in Xinjiang For Links to Turkey-Based Uyghur Scholar,” Radio Free Asia, August 22, 2020, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-siblings-08222020092753.html.

[84] Of the 177, 124 died in custody; of that number, 101 were Uyghurs, 20 were Kazkahs, and 1 each were Han, Tatar, and Uyghur-Kazakh. The numbers were generated using the database’s filter function; see https://shahit.biz/eng/#filter.

[85] “At Least 150 Detainees Have Died in One Xinjiang Internment Camp: Police Officer,” Radio Free Asia, October 29, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deaths-10292019181322.html;“Uyghur Father of Two Dies After Falling Ill in Xinjiang Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, April 12, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/father-04122018153525.html; “Uyghur Man Buried Amid Strict Security After Latest Xinjiang Reeducation Camp Death,” Radio Free Asia, June 8, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/gulja-burial-06082018164250.html; “Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, March 14, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/teenager-03142018154926.html; “Elderly Uyghur Woman Dies in Detention in Xinjiang ‘Political Re-Education Camp,’” Radio Free Asia, May 24, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/woman-05242018164854.html.

[86] Helen Davidson, “China confirms death of Uighur man whose family says was held in Xinjiang camps,” Guardian, October 2, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/china-confirms-death-of-uighur-man-whose-family-says-was-held-in-xinjiang-camps.

[87] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 41-42.

[88] Harry Cockburn, “Muslim woman describes torture and beatings in China detention camp: ‘I begged them to kill me’,” The Independent, November 28, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/uighur-muslim-china-mihrigul-tursun-torture-reeducation-camps-a8656396.html.

[89] Human Rights Watch interview with Ismail (pseudonym), 40, whose father died in a political education camp and his brother is held in a camp, May 12, 2018.

[90] Testimony of Mihrigul Tursun; Gerry Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News, May 17, 2018, recounting former detainee’s interrogation in a “tiger chair.”

[91] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 41-42; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018.

[92] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 3.

[93] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 2, 36, 41-42, 49-50, 54-55.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid., p. 50.

[97] Adrian Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 11, November 2019.

[98] “#MenmuUyghur” in Uyghur.

[99] Austin Ramzy, “‘Show Me That My Father is Alive.’ China Faces Torrent of Online Pleas,” New York Times, February 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/17/world/asia/uighurs-china-internment-camps.html.

[100] Xinjiang Victims Database, shahit.biz.

[101] Patrick Poon, “Families of missing Uighurs terrified to search for their loved ones,” Amnesty International, March 31, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/03/uighurs-too-scared-to-search-for-missing-family/.

[102] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019.

[103] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation.”

[104] US Committee on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, 2019, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019USCIRFAnnualReport.pdf; Jianli Yang and Lianchao Han, “Did a Muslim Slave Make Your Chinese Shirt?” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2019.

[105] “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/. See also, “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558501-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-2-Chinese.html, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558502/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-2-Enligsh.pdf, encouraging the use of 10-household units to monitor individuals in Xinjiang known to have obtained foreign nationality and applied for Chinese visas, or have obtained certificates from Chinese embassies and consulates.

[106] An acronym that stands for “Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Get Together the Hearts of the People” (访民情、惠民生、聚民心). These teams, also known as “village-based work teams,” were first implemented in the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 2011—then extended indefinitely—by then-Tibet Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. See Human Rights Watch, “China: No End to Tibet Surveillance Program,” January 18, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/18/china-no-end-tibet-surveillance-program; “200,000 Communist Party members Dispatched to Stay in Grassroots Villages in Xinjiang to Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Get Together the Hearts of the People” (新疆20万机关干部下基层住万村,访民情、惠民生、聚民心), People Online (人民网), http://xj.people.com.cn/GB/188750/361873/.

[107] Human Rights Watch, “China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region,” May 13, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region.

[108] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, May 2019, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0519_web5.pdf, p. 15-16.

[109] Xinjiang: 2017 Nián Quánmín Jiànkāng Tǐjiǎn Gōngzuò Quánbù Wánchéng (新疆:2017年全民健康体检工作全部完成), Xīnjiāng Rìbào (新疆日报), November 2, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-11/02/content_5236389.htm; Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions,” December 13, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-minority-region-collects-dna-millions.

[110] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 15; “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions.”

[111] Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions.”

[112] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 15; Isobel Cockerell, “Inside China’s Massive Surveillance Operation,” Wired, May 9, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/inside-chinas-massive-surveillance-operation/.

[113] Human Rights Watch, “Police DNA Database Threatens Privacy,” May 15, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/15/china-police-dna-database-threatens-privacy.

[114] Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region,” February 26, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “‘Ideological Transformation’: Records of Mass Detention from Qaraqash, Hotan,” February 2020, https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_QaraqashDocument.pdf, p. 16-17.

[115] Steven Melendez, “In locked-down Xinjiang, China is tracking kitchen knvies with QR codes,” Fast Company, December 20, 2017, https://www.fastcompany.com/40510238/in-xinjiang-china-some-knives-branded-with-owners-qr-codes; “When CCTV cameras aren’t enough: Chinese police order drivers to install tracking devices on their cars,” Fast Company , February 21, 2017, https://www.fastcompany.com/4031016/when-cctv-cameras-arent-enough-chinese-police-order-drivers-to-install-tracking-devices-on-their-cars.

[116] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 1, 24; “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region.” IJOP collects information such as the individual’s name, ID type and number, ethnicity, address, license plate number, profession, education, passport, phone number, relationship with head of household, blood type, height, photo, political status, religion, “religious atmosphere” (fair or strong), reason for seeking asylum or education abroad, destination country, exit time, changed identity? (if yes, to what), and reason for leaving Xinjiang. See also, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 14-15; and “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2), encouraging the detention of Xinjiang residents who IJOP identified as having obtained foreign nationality and applied for Chinese visas, or having obtained certificates from Chinese embassies and consulates.

[117] Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Program Targets Xinjiang’s Muslims: Leaked List of Over 2,000 Detainees Demonstrates Automated Repression,” December 9, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/09/china-big-data-program-targets-xinjiangs-muslims.

[118] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 13.

[119] Ibid.

[120] For information on targeted digital surveillance against the Uyghur diaspora, see Stevens Le Blond, Adina Uritesc, Cédric Gilbert, Zheng Leong Chua, and Prateek Saxena, “A Look at Targeted Attacks Through the Lens of an NGO,” San Diego: USENIX Association, 23rd USENIX Security Symposium, August 20-22, 2014, https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-blond.pdf.

[121] Paul Mozur and Nicole Perlroth, “China’s Software Stalked Uighurs Earlier and More Widely, Researchers Learn,” New York Times, July 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/technology/china-uighurs-hackers-malware-hackers-smartphones.html.

[122] Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts,’” Journal of Political Risk.

[123] Peter Stubley, “Uighur Muslims forbidden to pray or grow beards in China’s ‘re-education’ camps, former detainee reveals,” The Independent, March 22, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-education-camps-forbidden-beards-pray-pork-xinjiang-a8835861.html. See also, 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 8, describing how detainees should “adhere to the daily concentrated study of the national language (Chinese), law, and skills” and how camps should “make remedial Chinese studies the top priority.”

[124] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 9-10, 39-40. According to a former detainee, these rules included prohibitions on Islamic greetings, Uyghur and Kazakh writing on Uyghur restaurant signs, the use of Uyghur or Kazakh in public spaces, Uyghur- and Kazakh-language schools, and the establishment of minority-only chat groups on WeChat, QQ, and other social media websites; a ban on communications with any person in the 26 “sensitive” countries; and cash rewards for the intermarriage of Han Chinese and Kazakhs.

[125] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 38-39.

[126] Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News.

[127] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 11.

[128] Peter Stubley, “Uighur Muslims forbidden to pray or grow beards in China’s ‘re-education’ camps, former detainee reveals,” The Independent.

[129] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 3.

[130] Emily Rauhala and Anna Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia. Will the U.S. let her stay?” Washington Post, November 17, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/11/17/she-survived-chinese-internment-camp-made-it-virginia-will-us-let-her-stay/?arc404=true.

[131] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 69.

[132] Sophie Richardson, “China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch, April 24, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/24/china-bans-many-muslim-baby-names-xinjiang.

[133] Dake Kang, “Correction: China-Xinjiang-Banished Textbooks story,” AP News, September 3, 2019, https://apnews.com/4f5f57213e3546ab9bd1be01dfb510d3; Qiao Long and Yang Fan, “China Bans Use of Uyghur, Kazakh Textbooks, Materials in Xinjiang Schools,” Radio Free Asia, October 13, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/ethnic-textbooks-10132017135316.html; Darren Byler, “The ‘Patriotism’ of Not Speaking Uyghur,” SupChina, January 2, 2019, https://supchina.com/2019/01/02/the-patriotism-of-not-speaking-uyghur/; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 17.

[134] “Xinjiang’s ‘Open Letter’ Forces Uyghurs to Put Loyalty to China in Writing,” Radio Free Asia, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/ChenPolicy3.html; “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/.

[135] Byler, “The ‘Patriotism’ of Not Speaking Uyghur,” SupChina.

[136] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4.

[137] The rationale is that such names “exaggerate religious fervor.” Although not “illegal” per se, children with banned names cannot obtain household registration, which is essential for accessing public school and other social services. The ban was also imposed retroactively, thereby requiring parents to change their children’s names. Sophie Richardson, “China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch; “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia.

[138] Ibid.; Amnesty International, “‘Forgive my children for not fasting’ – Ramadan in Xinjiang,” May 3, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/05/forgive-my-children-ramadan-in-xinjiang/.

[139] Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Woman Handed 10-Year Prison Term Over Headscarf Claim,” Radio Free Asia, September 19, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/headscarf-09192017174307.html.

[140] Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang’s Korla City Seizes Qurans, Prayer Mats From Uyghur Muslims,” Radio Free Asia, October 2, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/qurans-10022017152453.html.

[141] US Committee on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, 2019, p. 37.

[142] Jon Sharman, “China ‘forcing Muslims to eat pork and drink alcohol’ for lunar new year festival,” The Independent, February 7, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslims-xinjiang-pork-alcohol-lunar-new-year-spring-festival-uighur-islam-a8767561.html.

[143] See “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558507/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-20-Chinese.pdf, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558508/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-20-English.pdf.

[144] “Suppressing religious freedoms: Chinese imams forced to dance in Xinjiang region,” Express Tribune, April 18, 2015, https://tribune.com.pk/story/871879/suppressing-religious-freedoms-chinese-imams-forced-to-dance-in-xinjiang-region/. See also, World Uyghur Congress and Uyghur Human Rights Project, Alternative Report: Submission to the United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT) In Consideration of CAT/C/CHN/5, 2015, p. 2.

[145] Regulations of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on Religious Affairs, 2014 (新疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务条例 2014), art. 40.

[146] CNES, Airbus DS, Earthrise, and AFP, “Then and now: China’s destruction of Uighur burial grounds,” Guardian, October 9, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/09/chinas-destruction-of-uighur-burial-grounds-then-and-now; “Even in death, Uighurs feel long reach of Chinese state,” Agence France-Presse, October 9, 2019, https://www.afp.com/en/news/15/even-death-uighurs-feel-long-reach-chinese-state-doc-1ky71r1; Adam Withnall, “China ‘building cark parks and playgrounds’ over Uighur Muslim graveyards ‘to eradicate ethnic group’s identity,” The Independent, October 9, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslims-burial-grounds-satellite-xinjiang-a9148996.html.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang Authorities Use ‘Burial Management Centers’ to Subvert Uyghur Funeral Traditions,” Radio Free Asia, April 19, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/burials-04192018141100.html.

[150] Cultural Erasure, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure.

[151] Joanne Smith Finley, “‘Now We Don’t Talk Anymore’: Inside the ‘Cleansing’ of Xinjiang,” ChinaFile, December 28, 2018, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/now-we-dont-talk-anymore; Lily Kuo, “Revealed: new evidence of China’s mission to raze the mosques of Xinjiang,” Guardian, May 6, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/07/revealed-new-evidence-of-chinas-mission-to-raze-the-mosques-of-xinjiang (“If one were to remove these … shrines, the Uighur people would lose contact with earth. They would no longer have a personal, cultural, and spiritual history. After a few years we would not have a memory of why we live here or where we belong.”) For a comparison of such demolitions to the demolitions of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries during Kristallnacht in Nazi Germany, see Fred Hiatt, “In China, every day is Kristallnacht,” Washington Post, November 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/03/china-every-day-is-kristallnacht/?arc404=true.

[152] Eva Xiao, “China pushes inter-ethnic marriage in Xinjiang assimilation drive,” Agence France-Presse, May 16, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/china-pushes-inter-ethnic-marriage-xinjiang-assimilation-drive-044619042.html; Darren Byler, “Uyghur Love in a time of Interethnic Marriage,” SupChina, August 7, 2019, https://supchina.com/2019/08/07/uyghur-love-in-a-time-of-interethnic-marriage/; “Xinjiang Authorities Push Uyghurs to Marry Han Chinese,” 2017, Radio Free Asia (2017), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/ChenPolicy2.html.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid.; Leigh Hartman, “China coerces Uighur women into unwanted marriages,” ShareAmerica, September 24, 2019, https://share.america.gov/china-coerces-uighur-women-into-unwanted-marriages/.

[155] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 11-25.

[156] Ibid., p. 4, 14-15.

[157] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.

[158] Known as Kuai Ya in Chinese.

[159] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20); Scilla Alecci, “How China Targets Uighurs ‘One By One’ For Using A Mobile App, Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists,” November 24, 2019, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/how-china-targets-uighurs-one-by-one-for-using-a-mobile-app/.

[160] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2).

[161] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 12.

[162] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 5, 83-86; Testimony of Mihrigul Tursun, Hearing before the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2018.

[163] Ibid.; Amnesty International, China: Uyghurs living abroad tell of campaign of intimidation, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/china-uyghurs-living-abroad-tell-of-campaign-of-intimidation/.

[164] Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts,’” Journal of Political Risk.

[165] Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families,” September 15, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families; “China: Children Caught in Xinjiang Crackdown,” October 16, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/16/china-children-caught-xinjiang-crackdown.

[166] Ibid.

[167] “China is putting Uighur children in ‘orphanages’ even if their parents are alive,” The Independent, September 21, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighurs-human-rights-muslims-orphanages-xinjiang-province-reeducation-a8548341.html.

[168] Emily Feng, “Uighur children fall victim to China anti-terror drive,” Financial Times, July 9, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/f0d3223a-7f4d-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d.

[169] Adrian Zenz, “Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 7, July 2019.

[170] “China is putting Uighur children in ‘orphanages’ even if their parents are alive,” The Independent.

[171] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families.”

[172] Zenz, “Break Their Roots,” Journal of Political Risk.

[173] Human Rights Watch, “China: Forcibly Returned Uighur Asylum Seekers At Risk,” December 22, 2009; “Thailand: More Uighurs Face Forced Return to China,” March 21, 2014; “Letter to Malaysian Prime Minister Concerning Forced Return of Uighurs,” February 1, 2013; “Saudi Arabia: Clarify Status of Uyghur Detainees,” November 23, 2020.

[174] Catherine Putz, “Thailand Deports 100 Uyghurs to China,” The Diplomat, July 11, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/thailand-deports-100-uyghurs-to-china/.

[175] Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China,” July 7, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/egypt-dont-deport-uyghurs-china; Matt Rivers, Max Foster, and James Griffiths, “Disturbing video shows hundreds of blindfolded prisoners in Xinjiang,” CNN, October 7, 2019.

[176] Joëlle Garrus, “No place to hide: exiled Chinese Uighur Muslims feel state’s long reach,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 19, 2018, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/08/19/no-place-hide-exiled-chinese-uighur-muslims-feel-states-long-reach/; Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China.”

[177] Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China.”

[178] Ibid.

[179] For a discussion about the history around these schemes, see Li Xiaoxia, “(新疆少数民族产业工人队伍发展及现状分析),” 北方民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2015.

[180] See, for example, 新疆的农村劳动力转移出现四个转变产生四大效应, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-06/18/content_652170.htm, mentioning that over 100,000 Xinjiang workers were exported to other provinces under the scheme in 2006.

[181] Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,” New York Times, December 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/asia/xinjiang-china-forced-labor-camps-uighurs.html.

[182] Shohret Hoshur, “Internment Camp Assigned Uyghur Forced Laborers to Xinjiang Textile Factory: Official,” Radio Free Asia, November 14, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/laborers-11142019142325.html.

[183] Fair Labor Association, “Issue Brief: Forced Labor Risk in Xinjiang, China,” 2020, https://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/fla-brief-xinjiang_forced_labor_risk_final.pdf; Citizen Power Initiatives for China, Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies, 2019.

[184] ASPI, “Uyghurs for Sale,” https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale.

[185] John Sudworth, “‘If the others go I’ll go’: Inside China’s scheme to transfer Uighurs into work,” BBC News, March 2, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56250915.

[186] Ibid.; 中国财富经济研究院智库报告-1009新疆和田地区维族劳动力转移就业扶贫工作报告, Nankai University, http://web.archive.org/web/20200507161938/https:/ciwe.nankai.edu.cn/2019/1223/c18571a259225/page.htm.

[187] 我省出台措施进一步加大就业扶贫力度, http://www.jcgov.gov.cn/dtxx/sxyw/202003/t20200315_890057.shtml.

[188] Bernhard Zand and Adrian Zenz, “The Equivalent of Cultural Genocide,” Spiegel Online, November 28, 2019, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-oppression-of-the-uighurs-like-cultural-genocide-a-1298171.html.

[189] 孙瑞哲分享十大行业发展热点 (Sun Ruizhe Shares Top Ten Industry Development Hot Topics), March 4, 2018, transcript, http://www.ccta.org.cn/hyzx/201803/t20180305_3683861.html; Jianli Yang and Lianchao Han, “Did a Muslim Slave Make Your Chinese Shirt?,” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2019.

[190] Matthew Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter, “‘Their goal is to destroy everyone’: Uighur camp detainees allege systematic rape,” BBC News, February 2, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071.

[191] Ruth Ingram, “Confessions of a Xinjiang Camp Teacher,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/confessions-of-a-xinjiang-camp-teacher/.

[192] Forthcoming ChinaFile publication.

[193] Human Rights Watch interview with Aina Shormanbayeva via an electronic communication platform, August 20, 2020.

[194] Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Abortions, IUDs and Sexual humiliation: Muslim women who fled China for Kazakhstan recount ordeals,” Washington Post, October 7, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html; Amie Ferris-Rotman, Aigerim Toleukhan, Emily Rauhala, and Anna Fifield, “China accused of genocide over forced abortions of Uighur Muslim women as escapees reveal widespread sexual torture,” The Independent, October 6, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-women-abortions-sexual-abuse-genocide-a9144721.html.

[195] Ferris-Rotman, “Abortions, IUDs and Sexual humiliation,” Washington Post.

[196] Ibid.; Ferris-Rotman, Toleukhan, Rauhala, and Fifield, “China accused of genocide over forced abortions of Uighur Muslim women as escapees reveal widespread sexual torture,” The Independent; Rauhala and Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia,” Washington Post.

[197] Maya Wang, “Ending the One-Child Policy Does Not Equal Reproductive Freedom in China,” Human Rights Watch, October 29, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/29/dispatches-ending-one-child-policy-does-not-equal-reproductive-freedom-china.

[198] Adrian Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birth Rates in Xinjiang,” China Brief, vol. 20, no. 12, 2020, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-UPDATED-July-21-Rev2.pdf?x19523.

[199] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.

[200] Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.

[201] Ibid., p. 7-8.

[202] 闫国灿同志在地区卫生计生工作会议上的讲话 (Speech by Comrade Yan Guocan at the Regional Health and Family Conference), 和田政府网 (Hotan Government Net), May, 30, 2015, http://archive.is/fCkb3; Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief; Joyce Huang, “Rights Activists Denounce China’s Xinjiang White Paper,” VOA News, March 19, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/rights-activists-denounce-chinas-xinjiang-white-paper.

[203] Emphasis added. Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.

[204] Ibid.

[205] See Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.

[206] Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.

[207] Ibid., p. 13.

[208] Ibid.

[209] Ibid., p. 15-16.

[210] Ibid.

[211] The acts are: “Murder; Extermination; Enslavement; Deportation or forcible transfer of population; Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; Torture; Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; Enforced disappearance of persons; The crime of apartheid; Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002.

[212] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(a).

[213] The Rome Statute further defines a qualifying action as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of [the enumerated acts] against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(a).

[214] An “attack” is a course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence. See Oxford Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 196. See also, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes (ICC Elements of Crimes), ICC-ASP/1/3, September 9, 2002, https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.pdf, art. 7. “Attack directed against a civilian population” means a course of conduct involving the commission of enumerated acts in the Rome Statute. The acts do not need to be part of a military attack.

[215] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), paras. 3, 11.

[216] ICC Elements of Crimes.

[217] See Darryl Robinson, “Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court,” in Roy S. Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute (1999). (“Explicit recognition of this policy element was essential to the compromise on crimes against humanity. It is the existence of a policy that unites otherwise unrelated inhumane acts, so that it may be said that in the aggregate they collectively form an ‘attack’. Delegations supporting the compromise explained that the policy element was intended as a flexible test.”)

[218] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), paras. 3, 11.

[219] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019.

[220] Ibid.; Austin Ramzy, “5 Takeaways From the Leaked Files on China’s Mass Detention of Muslims,” New York Times November 16, 2019.

[221] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20).

[222] Ramzy and Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy,’” New York Times.

[223] See, e.g., Enshen Li, “Fighting the ‘Three Evils’: A Structural Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Legal Architecture in China,” Emory International Law Review, vol. 33, no. 3, 2019; Kilic Kanat, “Repression in China and Its Consequences in Xinjiang,” Hudson Institute, July 28, 2014, https://www.hudson.org/research/10480-repression-in-china-and-its-consequences-in-xinjiang.

[224] Ramzy and Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy,’” New York Times.

[225] Ibid.

[226] Ibid. His confession and the investigation report were read aloud to officials throughout Xinjiang, and state media outlets portrayed him as corrupt.

[227] Ibid.

[228] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 25.

[229] Emily Rauhala and Anna Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia. Will the U.S. let her stay?” Washington Post, November 17, 2019.

[230] Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(c).

[231] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(c), n.11. The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held in the Kunarac case that exploitative conditions may rise to the level of enslavement when factors such as control of movement, control of environment, use or threat of force, psychological control, and other forms of coercion that would diminish a person’s free will are present. Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement in the Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, February 22, 2001, §§ 543-543, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf.

[232] See, e.g., Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,” New York Times, December 16, 2018, discussing state propaganda extolling the benefits of the “job training” program.

[233] United States v. Pohl, Judgement, US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, November 3, 1947, http://www.worldcourts.com/imt/eng/decisions/1947.11.03_United_States_v_Pohl.pdf.

[234] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(f), 7(2)(e).

[235] Oxford Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 519.

[236] Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(g).

[237] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(h).

[238] See Elisa Novic, Beyond Words: From ‘Cultural Genocide’ to ‘Cultural Persecution,’ Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016.

[239] Ibid., p. 148-149, citing International Law Commission commentary on the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.

[240] See, for example, Tactics from Turpan City, instructing officials on how to respond to the economic concerns of detainees’ family members; Adrian Zenz, “China Didn’t Want Us to Know. Now Its Own Files Are Doing the Talking,” New York Times, November, 24, 2019, describing the economic fallout of these policies.

[241] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(i); Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(i).

[242] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-2.

[243] Ibid., art. 7(1)(g)-5.

[244] Ibid., art. 7(1)(d).

[245] Ibid., art. 7(1)(d), n.12.

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